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Corporate Governance and MNE Strategies in Emerging Markets 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We explore factors of convergence and divergence in corporate governance of emerging and 
developed market economies, focussing on the role of firm internationalisation. In particular, 
foreign investments by emerging economy firms led to upgrade of their governance capabilities. 
These firms also became advocates for home-country policy reforms that mandated the 
development of similar capabilities for local firms.  We present a broad overview of the literature 
and propose an approach that considers the evolution of corporate governance, both at the 
national level and the firm level, with MNEs from both emerging market economies and 
developed economies as active actors in this process. 
  
1. Introduction 
We have witnessed widespread changes in national corporate governance systems (CGSs) 
across the world, and particularly across the emerging economies in the last 30 years. How have 
the competitive strategies of firms, particularly multinational ones, been both a factor in these 
changes and influenced by them?  Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, global policies promoting the 
liberalization of trade and investment have prompted demands from multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) for the modernization and standardization of national corporate governance (CG). India 
and China illustrate these complex trends. In 1995 India joined the World Trade Organization 
followed by China in 2001.  Both countries pledged adherence to new global standards protecting 
foreign trade and investment transactions.  Subsequently, firms in both countries became 
substantial foreign direct investors and issued new cross-listings of tradeable securities on the 
foreign share markets. MNEs from both countries established new international joint ventures 
and alliances, and also entered into international franchising, licensing, and distribution agreements 
with local firms around the world. At the same time, Indian and Chinese MNE managers were 
exposed to new forms of organizational know-how about monitoring and overseeing – i.e., 
governing – firm activities.  These managers shared senior managerial duties with foreign 
executives on international alliance steering committees and international joint ventures. They 
served on audit committees furnishing data to the Western accounting firms that assess the 
performance of foreign franchisees, licensees, and distributorships.  
That story has prompted this special issue. We sought papers that would shed new light 
on changing CGSs in emerging economies, and the role of MNEs as CGSs change agents. We 
started our work with a definition of corporate governance. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) proposed 
that corporate governance was about how a firm assures financiers of an adequate return on their 
capital. We followed Mahoney (2013) and others (e.g. Barney, 2018) to broaden the scope of 
relevant firm constituencies to go beyond those of shareholders and creditors. Corporate 
governance is how a firm assures all stakeholders of an adequate return on whatever they bring to 
the enterprise, whether it is capital from financiers, managerial skill from executives, labour from 
line workers, product inputs from outside suppliers, security from local governments, or patronage 
from customers. Typically, the assurances are country-specific, but for MNEs, corporate 
governance is not only national but transnational issue.  With MNEs, we need to think about 
assurances that correspond to both (i) national corporate governance and (ii) the transnational 
space between countries. 
With that definition in mind, we decided that an assessment of CGSs for any MNE in a 
country should follow three analytical paths:  CG related to public regulations; CG related to 
private ordering; and CG related to firm (particularly MNE) competitive dynamics. National 
governments regulate local firms while international agreements among national governments 
regulate MNEs operating across borders. When these regulations and agreements are clearly 
written, expertly applied, and adequately resourced, they provide public assurances that lower the 
contribution costs and raise returns for all stakeholders and firms in a country.   
This special issue presents new and novel research addressing this process.  The collection 
of papers challenges assumptions in the international business (IB) research about how and why 
CGSs differs among emerging economies.  The papers develop new theories and document new 
evidence about the role of MNEs in fomenting change in the CG systems of emerging economies.  
They offer new insight into how MNEs shaped CGSs’ trends in emerging economies since the 
1990s, and how the influence of MNEs will continue into the 2020s and beyond.  
To elaborate on these points, we organize the remainder of this introductory article into 
four additional sections. Sections 2 and 3 immediately below give readers the context for evaluating 
the originality and importance of contributions made by the papers in the special issue.  Section 2 
summarizes the relevant aspects of literature on corporate governance in emerging economies:  
how their CGSs has historically differed from what we observe in the industrialized countries; and 
how those historic differences correspond with broader institutional changes in the emerging 
economies since the 1990s.  Section 3 connects a change in country-level CGSs and firm-level CG 
to MNE strategies: how MNEs themselves adopt corporate practices from abroad; how MNEs in 
emerging economies act as agents of transnational institutional change in CGSs; and how 
competitive dynamics matter for both processes.  Section 4 discusses the special issue papers:  what 
new and novel insights they offer IB researchers seeking to understand how MNEs facilitate 
change in CGSs in emerging economies; why these insights matter for current IB research, 
practice, and public policy debates; and what new and novel insights they offer IB researchers 
looking for new avenues of inquiry on this topic.  Section 5 concludes our introductory article with 
a summary of the key points and their implications for IB research generally and the research 
published in this journal more specifically. 
 
2. Corporate governance in emerging economies 
For decades, principal-agent theory has provided a useful analytical perspective for the 
study of corporate governance characteristics and quality. Many business researchers (e.g. 
Eisenhardt, 1989) point to Ross (1973) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) for early formulations of 
the theory in the context of modern, publicly-owned, and publicly-listed firms. Principal-agent 
theory explains how and why such firms write contracts that provide the managerial incentives and 
oversight intended to advance organizational goals when control is divided between shareholders 
and managers. Typically, these explanations have greater relevance when firms have a diffused 
ownership model, with countless, often-transient, small-lot shareholders playing collective roles as 
principals trying to monitor and guide a handful of senior managers.  
Parallel to this, corporate governance research in law investigated the impact of 
management contracts, public exchange rules, and public regulations on self-dealing and 
malfeasance detection and deterrence.  The intellectual origin of this work can be traced back to 
corporate regulatory theorists like Berle and Means (1932), but principal-agent research in the 
1980s gave that work a fresh and often sceptical review. Indeed, by the end of the 1980s, many 
legal scholars and influential lawyers were asking whether the public regulatory approaches that 
mandated close managerial fealty to shareholder interests merited substantial revision (e.g. Lipton 
& Rosenblum, 1991).   
Furthermore, since the 1990s, a new interest in cross-country, empirically-oriented 
research brought finance scholars (e.g. Stulz, 1999) and economists (e.g. LaPorta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998) into legal debates about the optimal corporate and financial 
market regulatory design.  The “law and finance” research school brought large-sample statistical 
evidence to bear on questions such as whether stronger minority shareholder protections in a 
country attracted more equity capital investment (LaPorta et al., 1998) or increased the 
“premiums” paid to acquire control over firms (Dyck & Zingales, 2004). This research challenged 
the view that stronger corporate and financial regulation imposed only costly constraints on 
managerial action, finding instead that some “chains” (Dyck, 2001) on managerial action were 
worth the cost if those chains constrained managers from “tunnelling” (Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2000) out – more broadly, misallocation – of firm wealth that could be 
better invested in productive activities or paid out as dividends to shareholders.   
Legal research since the 1990s also saw increased interest in how different national 
corporate governance institutions might be linked through either MNE operations or the financing 
strategies of wholly-domestic firms. Research on international cross-listing is illustrative. As Coffee 
(2002) noted, most of the growth in new listings on large US exchanges in the 1990s came from 
foreign firms issuing secondary shares, often in the form of American Depository Receipts. 
Foreign MNEs were particularly active US cross-listers for reasons such as overcoming local 
capital market limitations (Foerster & Karolyi, 1999); or accessing local sources of finance to pay 
for local acquisitions (Saudagaran, 1988).  Coffee (1999) in law and Karolyi (1998) in finance 
proposed that foreign firms might cross-list in the US to subject themselves to (presumably) more 
demanding corporate and financial market regulatory scrutiny.  By voluntarily incurring the added 
legal costs of bonding with US regulations, foreign firms could signal their greater willingness to 
protect minority investors, thereby attracting a broader share ownership, lowering the net cost of 
equity capital, and increasing firm valuations.  Reese and Weisbach (2002) and others (e.g. Schrage 
& Vaaler, 2004) found indirect evidence of this bonding hypothesis in the cross-listing behaviour 
of foreign firms in the 1990s and early 2000s. 
Reviews of corporate governance related research (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Aguilera & 
Crespi-Cladera, 2016; Fainshmidt, Judge, Aguilera, & Smith, 2018) provide examples of 
convergence and divergence in managerial and legal research. They converge, for example, 
highlight the importance of common versus civil law systems as determinants of variation in CGSs 
quality. They diverge, however, regarding the effectiveness of international cross-listing as an 
effective strategy for firms seeking to bond with foreign regulatory regimes.  Management 
researchers like Siegel (2004, 2009) are sceptics, highlighting the paucity of public enforcement 
provisions that might encourage firms to adhere to foreign regulations.  Law and finance 
researchers like Karolyi (2012) and Coffee (2007) remain supporters, pointing to numerous 
instances of private enforcement via internal oversight and civil law suits that elicit firm adherence.    
Academic research on the factors of CG, and how they are influenced by wider CGSs and 
institutional set ups within which firms operate, has prompted public policy action.  One notable 
public policy research stream originated in the World Bank under James Wolfensohn’s presidency 
in the mid-1990s.  He commissioned policy-making teams to develop standardized cross-country 
measures of national public governance quality.  Daniel Kaufmann’s “Governance Matters” 
program is illustrative of the results.  Starting in 1996, he and various collaborators developed and 
published cross-country measures of broader public governance quality, such as country 
commitment to the rule of law and control of corruption by public officials (Kaufmann, Kraay, & 
Zoido-Lobatón, 2000).  Given the interrelations between the levels of quality of public and 
corporate governance, this initiative and others in the 1990s gave researchers in IB and related 
management fields (e.g. James and Vaaler, 2018) new tools to assess the variation in CGSs across 
countries at a given time, and within countries over time. Despite this, there is a plethora of 
indicators, and questions remain as to what studies such as the World Bank’s really measure and 
how well they do so (Cuervo-Cazurra, Gaur and Singh, 2019). 
So, what is specific for emerging economies for our CGSs’ assessment purposes?  The 
facile response is that CGSs in emerging economies lack the ability to provide assurances to 
investors and other stakeholders in comparison with the industrialized countries. If assurances of 
an adequate return to stakeholders derive from the strength of public regulation and private 
ordering of principal-agent relations, then firms in the emerging markets face greater challenges.  
Corporate law and securities regulation may be relatively new policy innovations, with only a 
handful of court and agency cases interpreting their application. Lower wealth levels relative to the 
industrialized countries mean that judges and regulators have fewer resources for the investigation 
and enforcement of the public regulations and private agreements that monitor managers. 
Therefore it is easier for managers to engage in activities that could be harmful to the shareholders 
(Singh & Gaur, 2009) and in some cases to other competitors (Pattnaik, Lu, & Gaur, 2018). 
Khanna and Palepu (2011) argue that weak CGSs are symptomatic of institutional “voids” 
in emerging economies.  Perhaps certain regulations or the elements of justice systems necessary 
to enforce them are missing; more often they exist but function in ways that give them greater 
variability; they are more mutable than missing.  Either way, shareholders lack the public regulatory 
and private ordering means to direct their managerial agents, thus imperilling CG and potentially 
capital, labour, and other inputs critical to firm survival and success. 
An alternative perspective however is that when the public regulation and private ordering 
familiar to industrialized country settings is missing or mutable, firms in the emerging economies 
improvise alternatives to assure stakeholders.  The family-owned, family-run firm is a common 
alternative. As Schultze and Gedajlovic (2010) explain in their review of this literature, family 
ownership is typically concentrated long-term ownership that encourages investments in 
managerial incentives and oversight.  Family management is de-layered as it may benefit from 
family trust, but also since family members are in limited supply.  Family firms encourage 
cooperation among and between the shareholding principals and their managerial agents, with 
family members often playing both roles. The prospect of repeated transactions induces reciprocal 
altruism, reducing the need for formal contracting.  And family firms are not necessarily limited in 
size since they can be at the centre of wider business networks or business groups (Gaur & Delios, 
2015). At the same, a dark side of systems based on family firms may emerge in those cases where 
strong family ties extend into politics and lead to self-serving entry barriers and business privileges 
that are but a step towards oligarchic structures (Bertrand & Schoar, 2006; Pattnaik et al., 2018).   
Some IB scholars describe emerging economy firms with concentrated ownership as facing 
“principal-principal” rather than principal-agency challenges (Bhaumik & Selarka, 2012). Family 
owners with a controlling bloc of shares can use their influence to “tunnel” out wealth (Johnson 
et al., 2000) that would otherwise enrich non-family minority shareholders; as can be seen in 
luxurious corporate headquarters with facilities that benefit family executives; donations to family-
preferred charities; favouritism in purchasing supplies from a relative rather than the lowest-cost 
provider. In these and other scenarios, firm wealth is neither invested profitably nor disgorged in 
the form of dividends that would enrich minority shareholders. Our own view is that the principal-
agent and principal-principal challenges of corporate governance in emerging economies are 
tangible yet manageable via these alternative informal approaches.  
How do emerging economy regulators respond to the lack of public and private 
characteristics that are taken for granted in developed economies?  It may be easy to pass laws 
mandating managerial obligations to serve the interests of shareholders, but it is not so easy to 
enforce them in public practice. Enforcement is costly. As perhaps the single most important 
shareholder rights enforcement agency, the US Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) has 
thousands of employees and a budget that in 2018 exceeded $1.6 billion (SEC, 2018).  The US 
federal court system, charged with the judicial oversight of regulatory enforcement policies, 
comprises tens of thousands of employees, including highly-trained, experienced judges, as well as 
a budget of nearly $8 billion to support those judges (Courts, 2017). Few countries can match such 
a resource base.  Emerging economy judges and regulators cannot, and thus firms often take a 
different approach to assuring adequate returns to firm stakeholders.   
Black and Kraakman (1996) suggest one such approach, which they describe as a “self-
enforcing model.” It features private ordering rather than public regulation of corporate 
governance practices. Outside shareholders (i.e., neither family nor affiliates of the family) exercise 
a check on managerial self-dealing via staggered directorial elections, cumulative directorial voting, 
mandatory percentages of outside directors, mandatory outside audits by private share exchanges, 
professional service firms meeting “international” (e.g. UK) standards, and even managerial 
performance bonds that can be liquidated in the event of self-dealing. Where there are public 
regulations, they create only a few “bright line” limits on managerial behaviour.  In a world where 
regulators have few resources, corporate governance quality in emerging economies simply has to 
rely more on private ordering.        
 Simpler, private-ordered, often family-based oversight of local firms explains much of the 
difference in CG between firms in the emerging-markets and the industrialized countries.  So does 
state ownership.  It is virtually axiomatic that state ownership injects “political” goals that often 
differ from the private investor’s wealth-maximizing goals (e.g. Shleifer & Vishny, 1994). This 
difference matters for the principal-agent incentives and monitoring that are to be written into the 
managerial contract of an emerging-market firm.  It is unclear whose incentives and monitoring 
interests should direct the contract-drafting process – the welfare-maximizing goals of the 
politician or the wealth-maximizing interests of the private investor?  And what if the interests of 
the politician are private, and not welfare-maximising? One way to decide is by comparing the 
percentages of state ownership.  As a fully state-owned firm becomes, first, majority state-owned, 
then minority state-owned, and finally fully privately-owned, the private investor gains governance 
influence and firm-wealth creation increases. Gupta (2005) documents that outcome in a sample 
of Indian firms.   
But some residual state ownership might yet be valuable to the private investor.  State 
ownership gives the politician an incentive to intervene on the firm’s behalf when, perhaps no 
longer driven by welfare considerations, a state regulator seeks increases in tax rates, royalties, 
domestic worker hiring, and other matters affecting firm profitability. Inoue et al (2014) document 
support for the beneficial effects of minority state ownership in Brazilian-based MNEs in the 
2000s.  Perhaps the mutability of public and private assurances in emerging economies like Brazil 
creates a kind of minority state ownership “rule” for local firms.  James and Vaaler (2018) 
document evidence that this minority rule applies less and less as home-country policy stability 
increases.  (Minority) state ownership may be a second-best alternative to better public and private 
assurances in emerging economies.  
The first-best solution arguably involves strong property rights based on the rule of law 
(Roe, 2008). Property rights can influence the extent to which ownership is dispersed, and hence 
can determine the nature of agency problems within firms: principal-agent vs principal-principal. 
Specifically, weak property rights that raise the threat of expropriation by both managers and the 
state are associated with less dispersion. These rights, of course, have to be supported by the legal 
institutions of the country. To begin with, contract law may not, in itself, be the sufficient basis 
for the enforcement of these rights and may have to be supplemented with corporate law that has 
a criminal component, e.g., to deal with phenomena such as insider trading. Further, the law has 
to be applied in a way that is neither seen to benefit specific interest groups nor representing 
favouritism, by say selective implementation. In other words, broad institutions can emerge as a 
force that can at least complement private and public assurances in the space of corporate 
governance institutions. One would assume that institutional development in emerging market 
contexts would witness simultaneous improvement in these different elements of the institutional 
environment.  However, changes in the components of the institutional system may not be 
synchronised in the same direction. When the rule of law increases in strength, CGS quality may 
decrease, and vice versa.  Figure 1 illustrates this. It presents data on two institutional components 
for several major emerging economies. The horizontal axis of Figure 1 illustrates change in the 
rule of law, as measured by the effective constraints imposed on the executive branch of the 
government, from 1994-2016 (Marshall, Jaggers, & Gurr, 2017).  The vertical axis measures change 
in the strength of minority shareholder rights (Guillén & Capron, 2016).  In Figure 1, Indonesia 
and Kenya increased strength in both dimensions, but they are exceptional.  Most other emerging 
economies in Figure 1 exhibit substantial change in strength along only one dimension.  
Bangladesh and Nigeria saw changes in the strength of executive constraints (rule of law) but no 
significant change in the strength of minority shareholders’ rights.  Brazil, India, the Philippines, 
and Vietnam exhibit the opposite trend. 
----------Insert Figure 1 About Here---------- 
The trends illustrated in Figure 1 suggest that CGS quality in emerging economies is 
changing on certain dimensions that matter for firms and other players such as home-country 
governments.  But the change is heterogenous. For a given emerging economy, assurances to some 
but not all firm stakeholders have strengthened. Across emerging economies, assurances to one 
particular stakeholder also vary. This heterogeneity likely rules out as primarily important the 
international agreements that might uniformly affect CGS quality, such as, the uniform terms 
adopted by countries joining the World Trade Organization.  We need to look at other agents of 
institutional change that might explain a heterogenous pattern of change in CGS quality.  We think 
MNEs are one such change agent. 
 
3. Emerging economy firms and corporate governance 
Thus far, the literature on emerging economy multinationals (EMNEs) has been bound by 
the traditional paradigms of international business, and has sought to explain EMNEs through the 
perspective of ownership advantages or location advantages, and by reference to the differences 
between EMNEs and western MNEs. Explanations of the development of EMNEs have been 
firmly based in internalization theory, with a focus on the different types of intangible assets that 
firms possess, and how this facilitates FDI by different types of firms. For example, Ramamurti 
(2012) develops a framework that explains the emergence of EMNEs despite their lack of firm-
specific assets. Gaur and Kumar (2010) review the recent trends in the internationalization of 
EMNEs and find that many explanations advanced in the extant literature derive from the 
internalization framework, despite there being significant differences in the motivations, paths, 
process, and performance between EMNEs and developed market firms. By contrast, the linkage, 
leverage, and learning (LLL) perspective (Mathews, 2006, 2017) discusses ways in which emerging 
market firms can leverage their linkages and undertake learning that can enhance the capabilities 
that can facilitate rapid internationalization (e.g. Gaur, Ma & Ding, 2018). 
Recent literature, however, suggests that a perspective based on corporate governance can 
improve our understanding of the development of EMNEs and the FDI emanating from the 
emerging market economies. For example, Singh and Gaur (2013) argue that in emerging 
economies such as India, family firms and business groups are more likely to invest in research 
and development to develop ownership specific advantages, and are more likely to invest abroad. 
Further, Gaur, Kumar, and Singh (2014) argue and find that business group affiliated firms find it 
easier to make a shift from exports to more aggressive forms of internationalization such as FDI. 
In contrast, Bhaumik, Driffield, and Pal (2010) argue that while family firms and business groups 
may be the optimal organizational forms in the context of the emerging market economies because 
of the institutional weaknesses (and missing markets) in these economies, the opacity of these 
organizational forms may act as a disincentive to investing overseas. This they ascribe to the 
demands placed on informal governance arrangements, and the lack of board level managerial 
capacity to handle more complex international networks. Bhaumik and Driffield (2011) find that 
these firms are more likely to invest in other emerging market contexts than in the developed 
countries where the emerging market firms would be subjected to significant scrutiny. Singh and 
Delios (2017) further analyze the governance structure of Indian firms by looking at the board 
interlocks. They find that when boards are structured with an eye to resource dependence, they 
help firms to pursue growth strategies in both the domestic and international markets. Within 
group affiliated firms, those that are more central to the network are more likely to expand abroad 
than those at the periphery (Singh and Delios, 2017). 
 Taking these issues together, it is possible to argue that IB as a discipline needs to move 
away from discussing governance issues merely in terms of institutional distance in corporate 
governance regulations, or from seeing national corporate governance systems merely as the 
context or as alternative metrics for institutional quality. Rather, we need to explore these issues 
in terms of the interactions between constitutional level features (rule of law, property rights), 
corporate governance regulation, and private governance (Cuervo-Cazzura et al., 2019). A good 
example of such analysis is the “escape hypothesis” (Shi et al., 2017; Gaur et al., 2018), which 
suggests that firms with “good” private governance seek to escape weaker locations largely to 
protect their intellectual property. This line of argument implicitly draws on the literature which 
suggests that firms that are located in countries with weak innovation systems and whose 
competitiveness depends on ability to innovate explore the possibility of “technological escape” 
whereby they relocate to countries with stronger innovation systems. This again highlights the 
emphasis that IB research places on firm specific assets and technology in explaining 
internationalization. There is reliance on the relatively narrow lens of internalization theory rather 
than taking a wider perspective on both corporate and general governance, and this remains the 
case despite the eventual widening of the perspective that is necessary to account for firm-level 
CGQ and the CGSs and wider institutional contexts within which the firms operate. 
We argue that viewing firm internationalization through the lens of corporate governance 
can improve our understanding, not merely of the internationalization strategies of EMNEs, but 
also of other aspects of internationalization. For example, the literature on joint ventures focuses 
on partner selection, and explores technological fit and strategic fit while seldom considering fit in 
terms of corporate governance, beyond exploring the importance of institutional distance 
(Krammer, 2018). We argue that by considering a wider set of corporate governance driven 
actions, such as due diligence or signalling, one can better understand not just the distinctive 
features of EMNEs but, more generally, those of modern IB. The idea itself is not new. Bhaumik, 
Driffield and Pal (2010), and Bhaumik and Driffield (2011) find, ceteris paribus, that the share of 
overseas assets of EMNEs increases when they have foreign shareholders who are generally 
associated with better CGSs. By contrast, if host country CGSs are not strong enough to overcome 
the adverse selection problems posed by information asymmetry (which can pose a challenge for 
developed country MNEs investing in emerging market economies) there can be market failure, 
resulting in a reduced likelihood of cross-border acquisition of assets (Bhaumik, Owolabi & Pal, 
2018). 
However, recent literature has taken this a step further, proposing that instead of better 
corporate governance facilitating internationalization, internationalization itself may be a way to 
signal better corporate governance. For example, the corporate finance literature explores the 
importance of establishing secondary “cross-listings” on overseas share markets (e.g. New York 
Stock Exchange). Typically, this is interpreted as a signal to potential investors and others that firm 
level corporate governance is “bonded” to laws and regulations, including those related specifically 
to corporate governance (Temouri, Driffield & Bhaumik, 2016) that may demand more 
transparency than is required in the home country. In the same vein, Col and Sen (2017) find that 
acquisition influences the board characteristics of Indian firms, and that these changes are more 
pronounced when the target companies are in countries with better investor protection.  
This places the emphasis on internationalization as a signal or facilitator of better 
governance, and one can extend this with reference to the strategic alliance/joint venture literature 
on due diligence. Consider, for example, an alliance between two partners, one from a strong 
institutional setting, and the other from a weaker one. The IB literature makes an assumption, 
based on internalization theory, that the risk (in the form of risk to a firm’s intellectual property 
rights) lies with the “stronger” firm, while the “weaker” firm provides a mechanism for 
overcoming opaque national governance in developing or emerging economies (Gaur & Lu, 2007). 
However, from a corporate governance perspective one could argue that the firms from weak 
locations may wish to signal their quality (Reuer and Ragozzino, 2014; Georgiou, 2019).  
Taking all this together, we argue that in seeking to explain foreign direct investment (FDI) 
flows between countries with different levels of corporate governance or institutional quality, the 
IB literature has become overly reliant on a paradigm that is based on the notion of intangible 
assets and the firm-level desire to protect these. As such, considerations such as signalling 
governance quality, due diligence, or transparency, are discussed in isolation or in particular 
settings rather than as a key pillar of the theory of the multinational enterprise. Thus, an analysis 
of internalization from the corporate governance perspective can now not only help us to 
understand location decisions, but also move the debate away from simple measures of corruption 
or intellectual property rights protection onto a consideration of the different levels and 
characteristics of the institutional systems, alongside the ownership characteristics of the firms. 
To illustrate the interplay between institutions and firms, in Table 1 we consider the 
outward investments from four major emerging market economies since the start of 2014. 
Specifically, we consider the ten largest greenfield investments and acquisitions from 2014 
onwards. The data used here are extracted from CBI-Orbis, provided by Bureau van Dyke. We 
consider four countries that represent different contexts and legacies: China; India; Mexico; and 
Russia. India and Russia have stronger protection for minority shareholders compared to China 
and Mexico, even though they have comparable disclosure requirements for related party 
transactions, which is often the basis for tunnelling (OECD, 2017). The four countries also have 
important differences. In China, the government has “much more influence over the economy 
than in virtually any other middle-income or developed country” (Naughton, 2017: 4). At the same 
time, it is more integrated, through trade and FDI, into the developed economies of North 
America, Europe, and East Asia than any other emerging market economy. In Russia, on the other 
hand, the transition from a communist economy to a market-based one “has not resulted in the 
emergence of impersonal, rule-based institutions. Instead, the natural demand for institutions that 
protect property rights has led to the emergence of alternative, inefficient institutions, such as that 
of cronyism” (Lamberova & Sonin, 2018: 615). Mexico, by contrast, has a legacy of strong political 
(and arguably not impersonal) intervention in the economy (e.g. Calomiris & Haber, 2014, Chapter 
10). However, since 1994 it has been a part of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) that has bound it with the USA and Canada, two countries with strong institutions. 
Mexico’s corporate governance arrangements have been discussed in a range of literatures that 
cover finance, corporate governance, and international business, see for example Siegel (2005, 
2009). While part of NAFTA, Mexico also has a number of firms who have sought to bond with 
or signal to US institutions through both FDI and other non-production forms of 
internationalization, such as cross-listing. Finally, since embarking in 1991 on an increasingly 
urgent market-oriented reform of various aspects of its economy, India has experienced 
improvement in various aspects of its formal institutional structure but continues to rank low on 
contract enforcement and the rule of law (Fuad and Gaur, 2019). It is also home to large and 
powerful conglomerates with concentrated ownership structures. 
INSERT Table 1 about here 
The data in Table 1 suggests that, for Mexican companies, acquisitions are focussed in the 
developed countries, notably the US and Spain, while new investments are focussed on Latin 
America. In both cases however, the majority of the investments are in manufacturing. For Russian 
companies, the greenfield investments are focussed on mining, largely in countries that would be 
considered to have weak institutions, while acquisitions are typically made in the developed 
countries. Chinese overseas investments have a similar pattern; Chinese companies, many of which 
are state controlled, invest in infrastructure in the emerging market economies while acquiring 
interests in developed countries, as well as in tax havens such as the Cayman Islands. While there 
are plausible IB explanations for this pattern, namely, market- and knowledge-seeking FDI in the 
developed countries (which is consistent with the LLL paradigm) and resource-seeking FDI in the 
developing countries, a corporate governance- and institutions-based explanation can also be 
provided for the pattern. Specifically, these emerging market (or in Mexico’s case, quasi-emerging 
market) companies find it optimal to make greenfield investment in the contexts of the (relatively) 
weak institutions with which they are familiar. In contrast, their acquisitions in the developed 
markets can serve as signals of their CGQ, which is superior to that of their domestic peers.  Such 
acquisitions also facilitate bonding with a stronger institutional context by the diversification of 
assets into contexts where expropriation by the government is less likely (with the exception of 
state-controlled companies). 
Finally, in the Indian case, many of the biggest deals are domestic, which is consistent with 
the available evidence about the reluctance of companies with concentrated-family ownership 
structures to internationalise. Internationalization takes firms out of the institutional context for 
which these organizations were optimised and subjects them to a measure of scrutiny that may be 
outside their comfort levels (Bhaumik et al., 2010). Further, insofar as overseas investments are 
concerned, many of these investments are made by firms belonging to (or related to) large business 
groups such as the Aditya Birla Group, the Jindals, and the Tata Group. This is consistent with 
the findings of Nayyar (2008, Table 7) who reported that, of the top 25 foreign acquisitions made 
by Indian companies between 2003 and 2007, four were made by ONGC Videsh and six were 
made by companies belonging to the Tata Group. These are companies with significant firm-
specific assets, who also benefit from country-specific assets such as economies of scale, access to 
finance, and political connections. Further, these groups of companies have experienced 
considerable bonding with strong institutional contexts via cross-listing, for example, Hindalco’s 
global depository receipts (GDRs) are listed on the Luxembourg stock exchange while Tata Steel’s 
GDRs are listed on the London Stock Exchange. Arguably, therefore, Indian companies that 
invest overseas, especially in contexts where they may be subjected to greater scrutiny and are 
therefore required to have strong internal governance, are the ones who have already overcome 
the internationalization hurdles and bonded to western corporate governance (Gaur & Kumar, 
2010). 
4. Papers in the special issue 
 Most of the submissions that we received chose to focus on the emerging market 
economies, which is hardly surprising since much of the literature on, for example, institutional 
distance seeks to focus on differences between the emerging economies and the West. However, 
in many submissions, authors moved away from the standard institutional distance approaches by, 
for example, extending the CAGE framework to a more nuanced consideration of the measures 
of both distance and firm behaviour in the context of different institutional settings, which was 
what our call sought to encourage. 
 To that end, we received, as this special issue reflects, papers that fell into two groups. The 
first group included papers that sought to explore the nature of institutional convergence (or the 
lack thereof) though the lens of international business. The paper by Carney, Estrin, and Shapiro 
(2018) builds on Fainshmidt et al.’s (2018) novel classification of the institutional systems of 
emerging market economies, exploring it in the context of international business in terms of the 
implications for firm performance as reflected by both productivity and exporting. Carney et al. 
(2018) argue that international business must offer institutional typologies that have worldwide 
relevance, rather than relying on approaches such as Varieties of Capitalism (VOC) that focus, in 
a somewhat limited way, on the developed West. They demonstrate that a multilevel, firm-centred 
approach can inform our understanding of the consequences of the evolution of institutional 
systems. Two of their most interesting findings suggest that alternative institutional systems impact 
different aspects of performance in different ways, and that foreign ownership has more impact 
on performance under some institutional systems than under others.  
This has a number of important and more general implications for the IB literature and 
presents a number of challenges for international business, including, for example, how 
internalization theory may need to be applied or interpreted. In part, the challenge lies in calibrating 
the focus in the extant literature on the impact of institutions on IB and corresponding MNE 
strategies, such as entry mode choice (Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik, and Peng, 2009). Foreign 
companies often adjust to (and take advantage of) the changes in local institutions as they introduce 
novel ways of doing things (Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann, 2003), but the literature does not yet 
fully address the complexity of these processes. The first challenge lies in abstracting the key 
systemic features of formal institutions, while preserving enough of the complexity and 
heterogeneity of the institutional differences between the emerging market economies. The second 
challenge, as argued by Carney et al. (2018), is to account for isomorphism, where both corporate 
governance and ownership of the firms adjust to the national environment. This results in 
correspondence between the national level (with its path dependence and stickiness) and the often 
informal corporate governance mechanisms at firm-level. At the same time, the entry of foreign 
firms and investors is an important source of change, and institutional evolutions may originate as 
much from these micro processes as from macro level policy decisions. These challenges open up 
the possibility of making new and important contributions to the IB literature, in particular by 
placing a greater emphasis on the (different-speed) changes and variations in national and firm-
level corporate governance. 
 Carney et al.’s (2018) contribution may be seen as extending the perspective offered by the 
Ownership-Localization-Internationalization paradigm (OLI), whereby success in foreign markets 
depends on both the ability to create and transfer ownership advantages and on the ability of the 
firm to match its firm-specific advantages (FSA) to the location advantages of the host market. 
However, they demonstrate that ownership advantages might be different for alternative types of 
emerging market national economies (EMEs), and even for different orientations of investment. 
For example, exporting strategies may work well in hierarchical state-led systems, but are not 
necessarily the appropriate strategies for targeting domestic markets.  
 The notion of intertwined macro and micro corporate governance evolutions is then 
explored further by two other empirical papers in this special issue. Grossman, Aguilera and 
Wright (2018) explore the extent to which corporate governance mechanisms at the micro level 
are adopted in Russia to compensate for its macro level institutional weaknesses. One key 
difference in corporate governance between the West and many emerging market countries is the 
existence of ownership concentration and principal-principal conflicts, which are exacerbated by 
the weak institutions in emerging market economies.  Private investors are typically assumed to be 
the main blockholders in such cases, but comparative to Carney et al. (2018), Grossman et al. 
(2018) highlight the role of the state, in this case as the owner of firms. The standard Anglo-
American governance response to this issue is to have independent directors, who have the role 
of monitoring and advising managers on behalf of all owners. Using Russian data, they find that 
the scale of theft and tunnelling in the state sector led to a micro governance response. While the 
presence of independent directors is associated with a reduction of blockholders’ appropriation, 
this is more accentuated in SOEs than in private firms. This result, which is somewhat surprising 
given much of the attention highlighting poor corporate governance practices in Russia, gives 
further credence to the notion of convergence, at least at the level of the firm. It does however 
highlight that adopting Anglo-American corporate governance practices may have a positive effect 
on investment. Still more interesting, Grossman et al. (2018) extend this result, showing that the 
role of foreign independent directors is especially positive, thereby suggesting that one of the 
paradoxical implications of adopting a populist autocracy based on a nationalist ideology is the 
necessity of relying upon foreigners to monitor the system’s performance. Since they are the only 
independent actors to be found, they are the most effective at monitoring and disciplining the 
other performers. 
 The main conceptual contribution of Grossman et al. (2018) is to explore how corporate 
governance practices travel around the world on a micro level.  However, in a theme that echoes 
the more general knowledge-transfer research area, they also explore some of the frictions in this 
convergence process, such as by arguing that the adoption of Anglo-American norms by boards 
of directors in developing countries may ‘get lost in translation’. Indeed, they show that Anglo-
American norms regarding the role of independent directors will diverge in unexpected ways 
according to the type of business ownership. In particular, independent directors seem to play a 
less significant role in local private firms compared to state owned firms. This provides further 
support for the proposition that board structures designed to address principal-agent problems in 
developed economies are not always applicable to the weak institutional contexts characterized by 
blockholder heterogeneity and principal-principal conflicts. Hence, while Anglo-American 
corporate governance practices might be a way of overcoming some country of origin liabilities 
that relate to weak institutions, it comes with limitations because part of the institutional 
weaknesses relate to the ability of firms to interpret practices as it suits them. Thus, the overall 
lesson from Grossman et al. (2018) is possibly that no corporate mechanism has an autonomous 
power to improve performance in EMNEs; they work only where they have been adopted by the 
controlling stakeholders, who are motivated to limit expropriation by investors and the destruction 
of their firm’s value. 
 We have already mentioned the preponderance of business groups or family holdings in 
the emerging market; a common lens for exploring their importance in the international finance 
literature is to examine their governance arrangements. The EMNE literature has recently 
highlighted that such governance structures are isomorphic vis-a-vis institutional voids. However, 
their opacity potentially hinders internationalization, particularly in terms of accessing foreign 
capital markets (Bhaumik, Driffield and Pal, 2010; Temouri, Driffield and Bhaumik, 2016; Singh 
and Delios, 2017).  
Similar to Grossman et al. (2018), Panicker, Mitra and Upadhyayula (2018) highlight the 
importance of micro governance structures as a response to such institutional voids. They dig 
deeper into the complex role that the institutional investors may play in EMNE settings and argue 
that it differs from that played in standard Western settings. They argue that not accounting for 
this difference is an important omission when seeking to link the theory and empirics, because 
institutional shareholders, in a similar way to family blockholders, may exhibit different attitudes 
to risk than other shareholders. Linking insights from institutional theory and behavioural risk 
perspectives turns out to be a fruitful way to examine both the direct and interactive effects of 
controlling owners. Showing that family ownership is negatively associated with internationalization, 
the results of Panicker et al. (2018) are consistent with Carney et al. (2018), who documented that 
oligarchic/family-led systems do not excel in exporting. Further, Panicker at al. (2018) also find 
that while pressure-sensitive institutional investors have a negative association with the 
internationalization of emerging economy firms, pressure-resistant investors have positive impact. 
At the same time, the attitudes of family owners towards risk are driven by their preferences for 
preserving their socio-emotional wealth, and parallel to that, their risk perceptions are affected by 
the institutional context in which they are embedded (Gaur et al., 2014). 
 Panicker et al. (2018) enable us to compare the institutional contexts of emerging markets 
with those of the developed markets, and to explore the extent to which banks act as strong players 
in the strategic decisions and monitoring of emerging market firms. Indeed, it is argued in their 
paper that banks may play an active role through appointing nominee directors (in lieu of creditor 
agreements), and that the power derived from their creditor-relationship with a firm gives them 
the means to influence its strategy. However, the banks, having a dual function, may also be 
pressure-sensitive investors, which limits their corporate governance role. In short, we could say 
that the evolution is not necessarily towards the German model but maybe towards the Japanese 
model whereby financial institutions are captured by large conglomerates.1 This finding is 
consistent with the wider discussion about the role of debt in influencing corporate governance in 
firms (Triantis and Daniels, 1995), and also highlights the importance of the choice of appropriate 
institutions when emerging market economies look to the West for the adoption of their corporate 
governance mechanisms. Where ownership concentration is ubiquitous, for example, and financial 
institutions can play a role in facilitating better corporate governance, the adoption of norms 
related to CEO duality and board independence may be less important than the adoption of 
bankruptcy laws and creditor rights. 
 More generally, Panicker et al.’s (2018) paper suggests that the concept of convergence in 
corporate governance, when discussed in terms of the adoption of “western” corporate 
governance rules and mechanisms by emerging market and developing economies, may be too 
narrow; what we may see is evidence for a complex evolution, converging towards more than one 
stable institutional system. While banks may enhance the role of non-executive directors who 
manage risk on behalf of small investors as well as other external creditors, it is again the 
monitoring and disciplining role of international investors that seems to be particularly important, 
echoing findings by Grossman et al., (2018). Overall, the findings reported by Panicker et. al., 
(2018) suggest that the external directors, as was seen in Grossman et al.’s paper, may curb excess 
investment, and that the ability of the firm to position its FSAs within a given institutional 
environment is an important element of performance. Outside directors in EMNEs, representing 
creditors, may exercise control and optimise risk taking. Thus, with very different settings, we see 
a convergence in behaviour resulting from interactions between ownership structures and 
governance structures. 
 The papers of Grossman et al. (2018) and Panicker et al. (2018) move us beyond the classic 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) paradigm of large blockholders, such as majority shareholders, 
expropriating minority shareholders, and the associated argument that blocks of controlling 
shareholders (such as families) may weaken corporate governance mechanisms by, for example, 
minimizing board independence (Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Gaur and Delios, 2015). We need a 
more subtle theory that accounts for the fact that even blockholders need external finance, and 
therefore it may be in their interest to rely on mechanisms such as independent external directors 
to deliver effective monitoring and enhance firm reputation. Moreover, in this respect, the highest 
                                                          
1 Following Williamson (1988), Panicker et al.’s findings also have important implications for the kinds of projects 
that can be viably undertaken in emerging market contexts, in that financial institutions, such as banks, are able to 
exert greater influence on corporate decision-making than minority shareholders in contexts where concentrated 
ownership (often in the hands of families) is the norm. 
credibility in terms of independence is achieved when these external directors are anchored abroad, 
perhaps even more so when they are anchored in contexts that have strong corporate governance 
institutions. 
 Similar arguments then motivate the paper by Areneke and Kimani (2018), which concern 
corporate governance response at firm level. The (partial) convergence of formal corporate 
governance codes between the emerging market economies and their developed counterparts, and 
the simultaneous persistence of divergent firm-level norms and practices also has implications for 
the phenomenon of a firm’s corporate governance internationalization strategic response such as 
cross-listing, or (as in Grossman et al., 2018, and Panicker et al., 2018) multinational directors. 
Specifically, the convergence of formal institutions reduces the liability of foreignness for MNEs 
in a developed country and investors in the emerging market economies and, at the same time, 
gives emerging market firms greater legitimacy in the developed countries. However, if the 
convergence in formal institutions is not reflected in firm-level norms and practices – consider 
family firms operating in Nigeria or government owned firms in China – then the question is 
whether it is still optimal for (emerging market) firms to signal their quality through mechanisms 
such as cross-listing (Karolyi, 1998).  
 The work by Areneke and Kimani (2018) focuses on ways in which EMNEs manage and 
mitigate the CGS-related institutional tensions between home and host countries, as well as the 
tension between formal governance institutions in the home country that may have been adopted 
from other sources and the traditional institutions governing management of firms in these 
contexts. They argue that EMNEs “manage and mitigate institutional tensions in governance 
regulations by implementing institutional isomorphism strategies that leads to diffusion of good 
governance practices from the country with the most efficient enforcement of normative 
guidelines to the country with weak enforcement.” This is done through two mechanisms, namely, 
cross-listing and bonding with the (usually) developed country institutional context that it 
facilitates, and the recruitment of multinational directors with expertise, experience, and 
knowledge of good corporate governance practices developed in their home countries. Areneke 
and Kimani (2018) demonstrate that EMNEs may use these strategies as substitutes but, given the 
institutional and regulatory weaknesses in the emerging market economies, they may strategically 
choose to recruit foreign directors over cross-listing. This complements existing evidence about 
the impact of the internationalization of EMNEs on the adoption of corporate governance norms 
such as board independence (Col and Sen, 2017) and suggests that labor mobility is an important 
part of convergence in corporate governance, encouraging bonding by EMNE firms. Such firms 
combine the incentive and motivation to internationalize with their FSAs and invite foreign 
directors to the board to signal institutional quality and facilitate internationalization.  
 The final paper, by Valentino, Schmitt, Koch and Nell (2018), focuses on the cross-
national organization of MNEs by exploring the role of national institutions and institutional 
differences in the decision to relocate intermediary HQs. The location of intermediate HQ is 
typically explained using firm-specific variables, such as the degree of internationalization, the size 
of HQ units, and the concentration of ownership, or by country-specific variables, such as 
differences in wages or corporate tax levels, but in either case while largely ignoring institutional 
quality. Valentino et al. (2018) argue that intermediary HQs are sensitive to their host country’s 
institutional quality and the associated transaction costs. As the institutional quality in host 
countries decreases, MNEs are likely to relocate their intermediary HQs because MNEs prefer to 
distance themselves from governments that can unpredictably establish unfavourable policies 
towards them. Institutional distance between the home and host countries makes the location of 
intermediary HQ stickier as MNEs may not have the necessary insights to make the relocation 
decision. The paper makes important contributions to knowledge about the MNC-subsidiary 
relationship by examining the location decision of intermediary HQs, which play an important role 
in managing the internal complexity of large MNEs. 
 Intermediary HQs are more likely to relocate if the institutional quality in their host country 
decreases. However, they try to reduce coordination and transaction costs by locating the 
intermediary HQ not too far away from their ultimate subsidiaries. Taken together, this suggests 
that while distance, both physical and institutional, drives the location of intermediary HQs, there 
are interesting differences in the way the two affect locational decisions. Moreover, an important 
contribution of the paper is that it introduces an explicitly institutional change perspective 
alongside, for example, Driffield, Mickiewicz and Temouri (2016). It is worth reiterating that 
international business decisions are based not just on the status quo but on expectations, and 
consistent with the results of Valentino et al.’s paper, these are primarily driven by the observed 
dynamics. Interestingly, while regional headquarters relocate to countries with a level of 
institutional quality similar to that from which they migrated, the new locations exhibit stability 
rather than deterioration in the institutional set-up. 
 
5. Key points and implications for IB research 
 Taken together, this suite of papers offers some interesting insights on the channels of 
convergence in institutional quality or corporate governance, and the roles of MNEs and other 
international actors in the process. It is relatively well understood that quality institutions, in terms 
of, say, rule of law or more specifically intellectual property rights protection, are positively 
correlated with the willingness of firms to engage in technology transfer, particularly to the 
emerging markets. For example, existing literature on the longevity of joint ventures highlights the 
tensions that exist at firm-level in terms of the relationship between host and home country firms 
but tends to ignore the complexities in the relationships between governance, wider institutions, 
ownership structures, and knowledge transfer in this setting. Building on this, we suggest that the 
papers highlight the needs for more research on the concept of convergence / divergence that 
goes beyond the ideas of signalling or bonding. Corporate governance research in international 
business needs perhaps to become more distinct from the finance-based literature which seeks to 
prove (or disprove) the signalling or boding hypotheses. Rather, we advocate an understanding of 
how corporate governance, alongside characteristics of wider institutional systems, influences 
firms internationalisation decisions, and how these, in turn, influence firm level governance. For 
example, the persistence of ownership and organizational structures in the emerging market 
economies and corporate governance continue to affect the way in which developed country firms 
and investors and their emerging market counterparts interact with each other. And, if conflict-
resolution mechanisms within the average emerging market firm remain informal and are 
underpinned by norms, as is often the case with family firms, it puts them at odds with developed 
country firms that may be more familiar with an arbitration process that is more judicial or has a 
more formal process.  
The papers do not give definite answers on some key questions but can hopefully help us 
to make these questions sharper. Is the process of corporate governance evolution unidirectional 
or multidirectional? If multidirectional, what are the key emerging models in EMNE theory? Given 
persistence, cultural differences, and political constraints that are difficult to overcome in EMNEs, 
how can some of the deficiencies in the institutional environments be overcome by foreign and 
local businesses?  
What seems particularly promising to us is the multilevel perspective, where serious 
attention is devoted to micro processes and to the capacity of businesses to adjust to their 
multilayer environmental conditions, possibly via monitoring and disciplining functions of 
corporate governance borrowed from the international environment, while still paying attention 
to local specificity.    
 
  
References 
Aguilera & Crespi-Cladera, (2016). Global corporate governance: On relevance of firms’ 
ownership structure. Journal of World Business, 51: 50-57.  
Aguilera, R. V., & Jackson, G. (2003). The cross-national diversity of corporate governance: 
Dimensions and determinants. Academy of Management Review, 28(3), 447-465. 
Anderson, R.C. & Reeb, D.M. (2004). Board composition: Balancing family influence in S&P 500 
firms, Administrative Science Quarterly, 49(2): 209-237. 
Areneke, G., & Kimani, D. (2018). Value relevance of multinational directorship and cross-listing 
on MNEs national governance disclosure practices in Sub-Saharan Africa: Evidence from 
Nigeria. Journal of World Business. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jwb.2018.10.003 
Barney, J. (2018). Why resource-based theory's model of profit appropriation must incorporate a 
stakeholder perspective.  Strategic Management Journal, 38(13):  3305-3325. 
Berle, A. & Means, G. (1932). The modern corporation and private property.  Piscataway, NJ:  Transaction 
Publishers. 
Bertrand, M. & Schoar, A. (2006). The role of family in family firms. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 20(2), 73-96. 
Bhaumik, S. and Driffield, N.  (2011) Direction of outward FDI of EMNEs: vidence from the 
Indian pharmaceutical sector. Thunderbird Review of IB, vol 53 (5) pp. 615-628 
Bhaumik, S.K., Driffield, N. & Pal, S. (2010). Does ownership structure of emerging-market forms 
affect their outward FDI? The case of Indian automotive and pharmaceutical sectors, 
Journal of International Business Studies, 41(3): 437-450. 
Bhaumik, S. K. & Selarka, E. (2012). Does ownership concentration improve M&A outcomes in 
emerging markets? Evidence from India, Journal of Corporate Finance, 18(4): 717-726. 
Bhaumik, S.K., Owolabi, O. & Pal, S. (2018). Private information, institutional distance and the 
failure of cross-border acquisitions: Evidence from the banking sector in Central and 
Eastern Europe. Journal of World Business, 53(4) 504-513.  
Black, B. & Kraakman, R. (1996). A self-enforcing model of corporate law.  Harvard Law Review, 
109:  1911-1982. 
Calorimis, C. W. & Haber, S. H. (2014). Fragile by design: The political origins of the banking crisis and 
scarce credit, Princeton University Press. 
Carney, M., Estrin, S., Liang, Z., & Shapiro, D. (2018). National institutional systems, foreign 
ownership and firm performance: The case of understudied countries. Journal of World 
Business. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jwb.2018.03.003 
Coffee, J. (1999). The future as history: The prospects for global convergence in corporate 
governance and its implications. Northwestern University Law Review, 93:  641-708. 
Coffee, J.  (2002). Race towards the top? The impact of cross-listings and stock market competition 
on international corporate governance. Columbia Law Review, 102(7):  1757-1831. 
Coffee Jr, J. C. (2007). Law and the market: The impact of enforcement. University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review, 156, 229. 
Col, B. & Sen, K. (2017). The role of corporate governance for acquisitions by the emerging market 
multinationals: Evidence from India, Journal of Corporate Finance, doi: 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.09.014. 
Courts. (2017). The US judiciary congressional budget summary (revised). June. Administrative 
Office of the US Courts. Washington, DC. 
Cuervo-Cazurra, A., Gaur, A. S. & Singh, D. (2019). Pro-market institutions and global strategy: 
the pendulum of pro-market reforms and reversals. Journal of International Business 
Studies, doi: https://doi.org/10.5465/AMBPP.2018.13360abstract  
Driffield, N., Mickiewicz, T. & Temouri, Y. (2016). Ownership control of foreign affiliates: A 
property rights theory perspective. Journal of World Business, 51(6), 965-976. 
Dyck, A. (2001). Privatization and corporate governance.  World Bank Research Observer, 16(1):  59-
86. 
Dyck, A. & Zingales, L. (2004). Private benefits of control: An international comparison, Journal of 
Finance, 59(2): 537-600. 
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Agency theory: An assessment and review. Academy of Management 
Review, 14(1), 57-74.  
Fainshmidt, S., Judge, W. Q., Aguilera, R. V. & Smith, A. (2018). Varieties of institutional systems: 
A contextual taxonomy of understudied countries. Journal of World Business, 53(3), 307-322. 
Foerster, S. R., & Karolyi, G. A. (1999). The effects of market segmentation and investor 
recognition on asset prices: Evidence from foreign stocks listing in the United States. The 
Journal of Finance, 54(3), 981-1013. 
Fuad, M., & Gaur, A. S. (2019). Merger waves, entry-timing, and cross-border acquisition 
completion: A frictional lens perspective. Journal of World Business, 54(2), 107-118. 
Gaur A.S., Kumar, V. & Singh, D. A. 2014. Institutions, resources and internationalization of 
emerging economy firms. Journal of World Business, 49: 12-20. 
Gaur, A. S. & Lu, J. (2007). Ownership strategies and subsidiary performance: Impacts of 
institutions and experience. Journal of Management, 33 (1): 84-110. 
Gaur, A. S. & Kumar, V. (2010). Internationalization of emerging market firms: A case for 
theoretical extension. In Devinney, T. M., Pedersen, T. & Tihanyi, L. (eds) Advances in 
International Management – The Past, Present and Future of International Business and Management, 
Volume 23, New York, NY: Emerald. 
Gaur, A. S., Kumar, V., & Singh, D. (2014). Institutions, resources, and internationalization of 
emerging economy firms. Journal of World Business, 49(1), 12-20. 
Gaur, A. S., Ma, X. & Ding, Z. (2018). Home country supportiveness/unfavorableness and 
outward foreign direct investment from China. Journal of International Business Studies, 49(3): 
324-345. 
Gaur, A.S. & Delios, A. (2015). International diversification of emerging market firms: The role 
of ownership structure and group affiliation. Management International Review, 55: 235-253. 
Georgiou, C. (2019). The dual role of due diligence. Climbing up and down the institutional ladder. 
Presented at UK AIB Conference, Sussex. April 2019.  
Grosman, A., Aguilera, R. V., & Wright, M. (2018). Lost in translation? Corporate governance, 
independent boards and blockholder appropriation. Journal of World Business. doi: 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jwb.2018.09.001 
Guillén, M. & Capron, L. (2016). State capacity, minority shareholder protections, and stock 
market development. Administrative Science Quarterly, 61(1):  125-160. 
Gupta, N. (2005). Partial privatization and firm performance. Journal of Finance, 60(2):  987-1015. 
Hellman, J. S., Jones, G., & Kaufmann, D. (2003). Seize the state, seize the day: state capture and 
influence in transition economies. Journal of comparative economics, 31(4), 751-773. 
Inoue C., Lazzarini S. & Musacchio, A.  (2013). Leviathan as a minority shareholder: Firm-level 
implications of equity purchases by the state. Academy of Management Journal, 56(6):  1775-
1801. 
James, B. & Vaaler, P. (2018). Minority rules:  Credible state ownership and investment risk around 
the world.  Organization Science, 29(4):  653-677. 
Jensen, M. & Meckling, W. (1976).  Theory of the firm:  Managerial behaviour, agency costs, and 
ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3:  305-360. 
Johnson, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F. & Shleifer, A. (2000). Tunneling. American Economic 
Review, 90(2):  22-27. 
Karolyi, G. A. (1998). Why do companies list shares abroad?: A survey of the evidence and its 
managerial implications. Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments, 7(1), 1-60. 
Karolyi, G. A. (2012). Corporate governance, agency problems and international cross-listings: A 
defence of the bonding hypothesis.  Emerging Markets Review, 12:  516-547. 
Kaufmann, D. A. (2000). Kraay, and P. Zoido-Lobaton," Aggregating Governance Indicators", WB Policy 
Research Paper, (2195). 
Khanna, T., & Palepu, K. G. (2004). Globalization and convergence in corporate governance: 
Evidence from Infosys and the Indian software industry. Journal of International Business 
Studies, 35(6), 484-507. 
Khanna, T., & Palepu, K. G. (2011). Winning in emerging markets: spotting and responding to 
institutional voids, World Financial Review, 18-20. 
Krammer, S. M. (2018). A double-edged sword? The antipodal effects of institutional distance on 
partner selection in cross-border alliances. Journal of World Business, 53(6), 930-943. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer A. & Vishny, R. (1998). Law and finance. Journal of 
Political Economy 106: 1113-1155. 
Lamberova, N. & Sonin, K. (2018). Economic transition and the rise of alternative institutions, 
Economics of Transition, 26(4): 615-648. 
Lee, J-H. & Gaur, A. S. (2013). Managing multi-business firms: A Comparison between Korean 
Chaebols and Diversified US firms. Journal of World Business, 48(4): 443-454. 
Lipton, M. & Rosenblum, S. (1991). A new system of corporate governance:  The quinquennial 
election of directors.  University of Chicago Law Review, 58(1):  187-253. 
Mahoney, J. (2013). Toward a stakeholder theory of strategic management. In J. Costa and J. Marti 
(eds.), Towards a New Theory of the Firm: Humanizing the Firm and the Management Profession, 
153-182), Bilbao, Spain:  BBVA. 
Marshall, M. G., Jaggers, K. & Gurr, T. R. (2017). Polity iv project, political regime characteristics 
and transitions, 1800-2016. Center for Systemic Peace, Vienna, VA. 
Mathews, J. A. (2006). Dragon multinationals: New players in 21 st century globalization. Asia 
Pacific journal of management, 23(1), 5-27. 
Mathews, J. A. (2017). Dragon multinationals powered by linkage, leverage and learning: A review 
and development. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 34(4), 769-775. 
Meyer, K. E., Estrin, S., Bhaumik, S. K. & Peng, M. W. (2009). Institutions, resources, and entry 
strategies in emerging economies. Strategic Management Journal, 30(1), 61-80. 
Naughton, B. (2017). Is China socialist? Journal of Economic Perspectives, 31(1): 3-24. 
Nayyar, D. (2008). The internationalization of firms from India: Investment, mergers and 
acquisitions, Oxford Development Studies, 36(1): 111-131. 
OECD (2017) OECD Corporate Governance Factbook. (2017). 
http://www.oecd.org/corporate/corporate-governance-factbook.htm 
Panicker, V. S., Mitra, S., & Upadhyayula, R. S. (2018). Nominee directors on Indian boards: Direct and 
moderated influence on international investments (No. 251). 
Pattnaik, C., Lu, Q. & Gaur, A. S. (2018). Group affiliation and entry barriers: The dark side of 
business groups in emerging markets. Journal of Business Ethics, 
doi: doi.org/10.1007/s10551-018-3914-2. 
Ramamurti, R. (2012). What is really different about emerging market multinationals? Global 
Strategy Journal, 2(1), 41-47. 
Reese Jr, W. A., & Weisbach, M. S. (2002). Protection of minority shareholder interests, cross-
listings in the United States, and subsequent equity offerings. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 66(1), 65-104. 
Reuer, J.J. & Ragozzino, R. (2014). Signals and international alliance formation: The roles of 
affiliations and international activities. Journal of International Business Studies, 45(3): 321-337. 
Roe, M.J. (2008). The institutions of corporate governance, In. Menard, C. & Shirley, M.M. (eds.) 
Handbook of New Institutional Economics, Heidelberg: Springer, pp. 371-400. 
Ross, S. (1973). The economic theory of agency:  The principal’s problem. American Economic 
Review, 63: 134-139. 
Saudagaran, S. M. (1988). An empirical study of selected factors influencing the decision to list on 
foreign stock exchanges. Journal of International Business Studies, 19(1), 101-127. 
Schulze, W. & Gedajlovic, E. (2010). Whither family business?  Journal of Management Studies, 47: 
191-204. 
SEC. (2018).  Fiscal year 2018 congressional budget justification annual performance plan & fiscal 
year 2016 annual performance report.  Securities Exchange Commission. Washington, DC. 
Shi, W. S., Sun, S. L., Yan, D. & Zhu, Z. (2017). Institutional fragility and outward foreign direct 
investment from China. Journal of International Business Studies, 48(4): 452-476. 
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1994). Politicians and firms. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(4), 
995-1025. 
Shleifer, A. & Vishny, R. (1997).  A survey of corporate governance. Journal of Finance 52:  737-783. 
Siegel, J. (2005). Can foreign firms bond themselves effectively by renting US securities laws? J. 
Finance Econ. 75(2), 319–359. 
Siegel, J. (2009). Is there a better commitment mechanism than cross-listings for emerging-
economy firms: evidence from Mexico, Journal of International Business Studies 40 (7), 1171–
1191. 
Singh, D. & Delios, A. (2017). Corporate governance, board networks and growth in domestic and 
international markets: Evidence from India. Journal of World Business, 52(5): 615-627.  
Singh, D.A. & Gaur, A. S. (2009). Business group affiliation, firm governance and firm 
performance: Evidence from China and India. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 
17(4): 411-425. 
Singh, D. & Gaur, A. S. (2013). Governance Structure, innovation and internationalization: 
Evidence from India. Journal of International Management, 19(3): 300-309. 
Stulz, R.  (1999). Globalization, corporate finance, and the cost of capital.  Journal of Applied 
Corporate Finance, 12(3) 8-25.  
Temouri, Y., Driffield, N. & Bhaumik, S.K. (2016). A strategic perspective of cross-listing by 
emerging market firms: Evidence from Indonesia, Mexico, Poland and South Africa, 
Journal of International Management, 22(3): 265-279. 
Teorell, J., Dahlberg, S., Holmberg, S., Rothstein, B., Pachon, A. & Svensson. R. (2018). The 
Quality of Government Standard Dataset, version Jan 2018. University of Gothenburg: 
The Quality of Government Institute, doi: http://www.qog.pol.gu.se 
doi:10.18157/QoGStdJan18 
Triantis, G.G. & Daniels, R.J. (1995). The role of debt in interactive corporate governance, 
California Law Review, 83(4): 1073-1113. 
Vaaler, P. M., Schrage, B. N., & Block, S. A. (2005). Counting the investor vote: Political business 
cycle effects on sovereign bond spreads in developing countries. Journal of International 
Business Studies, 36(1), 62-88. 
Valentino, A., Schmitt, J., Koch, B., & Nell, P. C. (2018). Leaving home: An institutional 
perspective on intermediary HQ relocations. Journal of World Business. doi: 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jwb.2018.08.004 
Williamson, O.E. (1988). Corporate finance and corporate governance, Journal of Finance, 43(3): 
567-591. 
World Bank. (2010). Country categories. World Bank: Washington, DC. 
 
 
  
Figure 1. Change in Executive Constraints and Shareholder Rights in 1994 and 2016 
 
Source:  
Horizontal axis - effective constraints on the executive branch of the government indicator in 1994 and 
then 2016 from Polity IV project (Marshall et al., 2017);  
Vertical axis: protection of minority shareholders right index in 1994 and 2016 (Guillén & Capron, 2016) 
from the Quality of Government project (Teorell et al., 2018).  
  
Table 1: Foreign investment by Emerging market Countries, Examples of largest investments by 
locations and type 2015-2018 
Foreign Greenfield Investment 
Transactions 
Value 
$m 
Foreign Merger & Acquisition 
Transactions 
Country 
Value 
$m 
Mexico     
Cemex (Name) manufacturing 
project in Columbia 
340 
Mexico Transportes acquires Florida 
East Coast Railway Holdings from 
Fortress Investment Group 
USA 2100 
Grupo Bimbo's San Fernando 
warehouse project in Argentina 
300 
Arca Continental acquires 47.54% 
minority stake in Corporacion 
Lindley from the Lindley family 
Peru 760 
Grupo Bimbo’s San Fernando 
bread manufacturing project in 
Argentina  
300 
Vitro acquires PPG Industries flat 
glass business 
USA 750 
Arca Continental Lima 
manufacturing project in Peru 
200 
Grupo Bimbo acquires East Balt 
bakery 
USA 650 
Cemex San Pedro de Macrois 
electricity project Dominican 
Republic 
197 
Mexichem acquires Dura-Line from 
CHS Capital 
USA 630 
Emesa-TTX Development San 
Rafael wind electricity project 
Argentina 
184 
Elementia acquires a 55% majority 
stake in Giant Cement 
USA 525 
Grupo Posada Punta Cana hotel 
project Dominican Republic 
130 
ASUR and PSP Investments take a 
50% minority stake in Aerostar from 
Oaktree Capital 
Puerto Rico 430 
Zagis manufacturing project USA 130 
Branch Management acquires ISC 
Fresh Water Investment 
Spain 400 
Russia         
Rusatom Overseas opens 
Electricity project in Jordan 
10000 
Rosneft completes acquisiton of 
TNK-BP from BP 
Virgin 
Islands 
(British) 
27513 
RT Global Resources opens 
Logistics, Distribution & 
Transportation project in 
Pakistan 
2500 
Tele2 completes the sale of Tele2 
Russia to Bank VTB 
Sweden 3550 
RT Global Resources opens 
Manufacturing project in Uganda 
2500 
Baker & McKenzie advised Yamal 
Razvitie on the acquisition of stake in 
Artic Russia 
Netherlands 2940 
Nitro Sibir opens Manufacturing 
project in Kalgoorlie, Australia 
1322 
Enel completes sale of stake in 
SeverEnergia (Artic Russia) to 
Rosneft's NGK Itera 
Netherlands 1800 
Rosneft opens Extraction project 
in Venezuela 
1317 MegaFon acquires Maxiten Co Cyprus 1746 
LUKOIL opens gas pre-
treatment unit in Gissar, 
Uzbekistan 
1195 
Rosneft acquires BP's stake in PCK 
Raffinerie 
Germany 1522 
LUKOIL opens gas treatment 
plant in Gissar, Uzbekistan 
1195 
Gazprom to inject capital in Nord 
Stream 2 
Switzerland 1515 
Gazprom Neft has opened a gas 
processing manufacturing plant 
in Badra, Iraq 
1183 
Atomredmetzoloto and Uranium 
acquires remaining shares of 
Uranium One 
Canada 1292 
China         
CFLD to invest in residential, 
commercial and infrastructure 
sectors in new city in Egypt 
20000 
MMG, CITIC Group and Guoxin 
International Investment acquire 
Xstrata Peru from Glencore Xstrata 
Peru 7000 
Pavilion and Genting to develop 
multi-sector complex in Ho Chi 
Minh City, Vietnam 
6000 
HNA Group takes a minority stake 
in Hilton Worldwide Holdings from 
Blackstone 
USA 6500 
Dalian and Auchan to establish 
EuropaCity in Paris, France 
3686 
Anbang Insurance Group acquires 
Strategic Hotels & Resorts from 
Blackstone's BRE Diamond Hotel 
Holdings through its Blackstone 
Real Estate Partners VIII fund 
USA 6500 
China Petroleum Pipeline Bureau 
Engineering Co., Ltd, Empresa 
Nacional de Hidrocarbonetos 
E.P, Profin Consulting Sociedade 
Anonima, and Sacoil Holdings 
Ltd's gas pipeline in Gauteng, 
South Africa 
3000 
Tianjin Tianhai Investment acquires 
Ingram Micro 
USA 6000 
China Petroleum Pipeline Bureau 
Engineering Co., Ltd, Empresa 
Nacional de Hidrocarbonetos 
E.P, Profin Consulting Sociedade 
Anonima, and Sacoil Holdings 
Ltd's gas pipeline in Mozambique 
3000 
Neptune Energy acquired Engie 
E&P International 
France 5854 
Sany opens Electricity project in 
India 
3000 
Investor group led by Brookfield 
Infrastructure Partners acquires 
majority stake in Nova 
Transportadora from Petroleo 
Brasileiro 
Brazil 5200 
China Huaneng opens Electricity 
project in Nana Layja, India 
3000 
Global Infrastructure Management, 
Public Sector Pension Investment 
Board and others acquire Equis 
Energy from Equis 
Singapore 5000 
Sinohydro Resources opens 
Electricity project in Karachi, 
Pakistan 
2090 
State Grid International acquires 
majority stake in SPI (Australia) 
Assets from Singapore Power 
Australia 4274 
Chint Group opens Electricity 
project in India 
2000 
Edra Global Energy sells energy 
assets to China General Nuclear 
Power 
Malaysia 4267 
Shandong Tralin Paper Co Ltd 
opens Manufacturing project in 
Richmond (VA), US 
2000 
China National Petroleum 
Corporation to acquire stake in Eni 
East Africa: Transaction completes 
Mozambique 4210 
Aviation Industry Corporation of 
China opens Electricity project in 
Iran 
1600 
Atlantia sold a stake of Autostrade 
per  l'Italia 
Italy 3518 
Shanghai Electric opens 
Electricity project in Morocco 
2000 
Dalian Wanda Group acquires 
Legendary Entertainment 
USA 3500 
China Triumph International 
Engineering opens 
Manufacturing project in 
Ulyanovsk, Russia 
3000 
Apache Corporation sells minority 
stake in its Egyptian oil and gas 
business to Sinopec 
Egypt 2950 
Addax Petroleum opens 
Education & Training project in 
Port-Gentil, Gabon 
1363 
HNA Group completes acquisition 
of Swissport from PAI 
Switzerland 2774 
 
